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## Ticker: NYSE:ABR
### Arbor Realty Trust

# Qualitative Analysis
Two business segments: Structured Loan Origination and Investment Business
Invest in the multifamily, single-family rental (“SFR”) and commercial real estate markets
Also invest in real estate-related joint ventures and may directly acquire real property and invest in real estate-related notes and certain mortgage-related securities.
Organized to qualify as a real estate investment trust (“REIT”)
We provide a suite of comprehensive customized financing solutions to meet the various needs of borrowers. We target borrowers whose options may be limited by conventional bank financing.

# timeframe
default by max may 2025

# 16 feb earnings
Arbor CEO has just proclaimed that delinquencies are in the low single digits and the CLO data that Viceroy obtained from the trustee is wrong.

This is a blatant lie, and easily verifyable

# viceroy research
PT = 0$
Viceroy’s dive into Arbor’s CLOs suggest its entire loan book is distressed
and underlying collateral is vastly overstated. These loans do not qualify for refinancing anywhere, and
substantially all mature within the next 18 months. (written nov 16 2023)

0% to 5% rates as derailed all ABR projects

The current underlying DSCR of Arbor’s ~$7.6b CLOs is about 0.63x meaning their OI covers only 63% of their total debt service.
There is no feasible rate cuts in the next 18 months that could salvage these projects.

Arbor’s business model is to finance bridge loans for multifamily residential unit investments, typically through renovation periods. After renovation, Arbor can then refinance these bridge loans into agency loans.

In order to access liquidity against these floating rate bridge loans, Arbor established Collateralized Loan
Obligation facilities (CLOs)

Billions of dollars of loans in CLOs were made to finfluencers and real estate “guru” syndicates who have
zero real estate investment backgrounds. ex: Elisa Zhang

Significant portion of the properties underlying the CLOs have atrocious reviews, including pictures, and
have not been rehabilitated. Some properties have already been condemned and labelled as slums.

Poor maintenance, poor security, vandalism, theft, and shootings are widely reported among properties.

Lack of authentic good review

Management appears to be raising rents of properties without any actual rehabilitation.

The only feasible way that we believe Arbor can continue as a going concern is by refinancing bridging loans. Per
above, we note that doing this is effectively just prolonging a catastrophe

Arbor’s loan book substantially matures over the next 18 months. As shown in Section 6 below, new
originations are fading quickly in high-rate environments that do not support most multifamily rehabilitation
bridging projects

NOI figures have not improved.

The CLOs will inevitably breach covenants and become distressed

Horrible management of propeties

Severals lenders in Arbor’s CLOs (that arbor made loan's to) are in financial troubles